Abstract: Bayelsa State -the heartland of the Ijaw ethnic group -is arguably the most important of the core states of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in terms of the oil industry; and where incidences of both state and non-state violence were occurring regularly at the time of research. This paper seeks to empirically examine the role of contextual variables, like the mobilised Ijaw ethnic group, who are embedded in conflict in an area of Nigeria rich with oil resources. I argue that the role of Ijaw ethnic group could not be ignored, but that it changed the emphasis from 'elite-led' campaigns to the more popular and local level violent anti-state and anti-oil company agitations. Following on from this, I argue that post-2000 oil resource-related conflict and state responses resulted in serious human rights violations and a humanitarian disaster for the most vulnerable members of the population of the region, notably women and children.
Introduction
The focus of this paper is the socially-constructed ethnic identity which emphasises that individuals have multiple identities, which therefore compels an examination of the historical and cultural contexts of Ijaw ethnic group politics and violence. Thus a nuanced view of the role of ethnic politics -or the 'constructivist' view of ethnicity -in conflict is emphasised, taking into account Ijaw history and rhetoric in contemporary Nigeria. This suggests that the role of 'politicised' Ijaw ethnic politics can not be ignored in state and non-state violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. In this context, mobilised ethnicity refers to the articulation of interests in the name of the Ijaw ethnic group, and the struggle to defend those interests. In this sense, ethnic identity is politically mobilised and then manipulated so that political and material grievances become ethnically defined -this is a useful entry point into this paper.
I argue that the role of highly 'politicised' Ijaw ethnic politics could not only be ignored by the end of the 1990s but that it also changed the emphasis from being elite-led and party-type campaigns about state creation and revenue allocation primarily at the national arena to the more popular and local level anti-state and anti-oil company agitations, elevating for example, oil-related environmental degradation -an objective grievance which forms but one layer in an onion-like ball of issues in Ijawland -to political orthodoxy; as a conflict issue in and of itself. In this sense, the Ijaw ethnic groups interpret environmental neglect to discrimination against them by the Nigerian federal system. Second, I contend that the changing dynamics of Ijaw ethnic politics were inevitable from the 1990s onwards -given local and international variables. Third and lastly, I argue in this paper that more effective conflict resolution or peace-building is enhanced by good economic and political governance driven by human rights-driven peace initiatives rather than the 'old' and 'new' strategies of Ijaw politics, such as Kaiama Declaration and militarised state policy. Hence the Kaiama Declaration (see Appendix A) is presumably better analysed in the context of the changing historical antecedent of Ijaw ethnic minority discourse and response to Nigeria's federal system.
Background
Historically, different groups of self-governing peoples in the nineteenth century occupied the territories that became known as Nigeria.
1 These peoples were known to have established viable pre-colonial states, which included caliphates, empires, kingdoms and mini-city states across the present geo-political space of Nigeria.
2 Based on a World Bank estimation Nigeria is the most populated country and second largest economy on the continent of Africa. However, with the advent of the age of colonial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century, each pre-colonial society in the territories that became known as Nigeria was conquered and colonised from the Atlantic coast to the Sahara desert by the British.
Interestingly, scholars argue that decolonisation via the constitutional processes of the 1950s coincided with the end of the Second World War; an era that also witnessed increased anti-colonial struggles. 3 Suffice to say that Great Britain drew on the benefits of popular democracy at home founded on the parliamentary system, as well as its experiences in North American colonies, to drive its favourable disposition toward constitutional and political reforms in the colonies. In this context, the pace of constitutional development in Nigeria quickened, especially between 1946 and 1960.
Importantly for this paper, pre-colonial societies were not principally distinguished by unequal population size but by their different socio-political organisations dictated by their different cultures, history, environment, and needs. 4 The unequal size and population of the numerous ethnic groups in Nigeria was less of a subject of great importance in the early years of colonialism, and certainly not in pre-colonial societies. Arguably, this might have been because population size did not directly relate to political power in any significant sense at the time. However, the phenomenon of conflict along the size of ethnic groups in Nigeria, often termed the 'minority ethnic question' is arguably linked to a series of constitutional developments in Nigeria in the 1950s.
To this extent, the structural formation of that era reinforced ethnic loyalties in political organisations, which not only subordinated smaller demographic groups to their larger ethnic neighbours in each region, but also created minority fears of marginalisation in Nigerian politics. The perceived imbalance from the standpoint of ethnic minorities emanated from the link between 'power and numbers', which could not be entirely correct. More plausible was the politicisation that occurred around ethnic divisions, the practice of majoritarian democracy, and the fact that ethnic majorities voted on ethnic lines, and hence ethnic minorities could never 'win' in such a system. Arguably, the implications of the emergence of minority ethnic politics since the constitutional development arrangement of the 1950s (and the instability of Nigeria's political history associated with it) provided a fertile background for the rise or take-off of a stronger and more vigorous Ijaw ethnic minority politics. Though the explanations adduced for political crises in Nigeria are diverse and differ -at least in their emphasis -as to Nigeria's ethnic background and heterogeneity, the minority question argument commands wide acceptance.
5 This perspective asserts that Nigeria was carved out into three regions controlled by the dominant three ethnic groups; hence, each region had both 'big' and 'small' ethnic groups. Because power belonged to the regions, the 'big' ethnic groups and their political parties were perceived as having power in their hands at the expense of 'small' ethnic groups within their regions. The 'minority question' was a part of politics before the rise in economic importance of oil resources for the Nigerian economy and government revenues found mainly in Ijawland.
7 Geographically, Bayelsa State -the stronghold of Ijaw ethnic group politics -lies within latitude 4.15oN, 5.23oN and longitude 5.22oE and 6.45oE, and the state's vegetation is classified as fresh water alluvial, rainforest, and saline mangrove, which are dissected by numerous rivers; mainly the Nun and Forcadoes rivers.
8 In this Niger Delta geographic location, the Ijaw state is one of the six ethnic states of the South-South geo-political area. Bayelsa is surrounded by Delta State to the north and Rivers State to the east while west, and the southern frontiers of the state are washed by the Gulf of Guinea, which makes it the longest coastline in Nigeria. Furthermore the continental shelf of the Ijaw state (see Figure A) is part of the South Atlantic waters, which adjoins the Gulf of Guinea States, namely Angola, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Princípe.
Bayelsa's location near the Gulf of Guinea means that this state has shared in the attention drawn towards the Niger Delta as a whole, due to the contribution the region is poised to make to the global oil supply in the coming decades.
9 Thus beyond the Gulf 's geographical and historical meanings, the Ijaw state's importance lies in the fact that it 'houses' significant oil infrastructure of the Niger Delta region due to the exploration and production of on-shore and deep-water oil resources. The latter are adjacent to its continental shelf and have the potential to produce conflict over the Exclusive Economic Zone close to its maritime borders. However, state and non-state violence and conflict in Ijawland are frequent and pose a significant threat to Nigeria's oil-dependent economy and 'fragile' statehood. 11 Bayelsa is the heartland of the Ijaw ethnic group and politics; and it has been associated with ethnic minority politics since the constitutional development arrangement of the 1950s that prepared Nigeria for independence in 1960. Arguably they are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria and the biggest ethnic minority group in the Niger Delta. From the standpoint of the Ijaw, the politics of state creation and revenue allocation had brought very limited gains to Ijaw ethnic minority aspirations, as I have illuminated within another forthcoming paper. 12 Despite the creation of Bayelsa State and the beneficial difference it made in the polity, there were compelling issues on the ground to easily instrumentalise Ijaw grievances. This paper, however focuses on the Kaiama Declaration and youth groups and their link with non-state violence, 13 which has become a significant feature of constructed Ijaw ethnic politics. 'Youth' in this context, is an Ijaw and Nigerian expression, which does not necessarily mean young people between childhood and adult age. Bassey's work argues lucidly that 'youth' consists of school dropouts, the unemployed, and energetic people under 50 years of age who find 'solace in a crisis situation as they consider such a situation as an opportunity to be engaged, or to be useful to themselves and their ethnic group'. This paper was derived from my extensive research in the Niger Delta that sought to investigate whether or not oil resource-related conflict in Nigeria could be adequately explained by a political economy analysis that associates petroleum and other minerals in developing economies to negative development outcomes, such as violence. However, this paper steps down from the wider 'resource curse' debate into the era that was marked not only by increasingly militant activism as the main strategy of oil resource-related conflict in Nigeria, but also associated with the rise of a 'new' wave of popular-based Ijaw ethnic political associations using the language and rhetoric of Ijaw rights and emancipation.
15
The political economy analysis of the link between natural resources and violence is instructive and seem to be relevant to the Ijaw case; however, current debate and scholarship strongly suggest that other variables might have played an equally important role in violence in the oil states of Nigeria. Arguably, the resource factor might have been reinforced by other contextual variables -like Ijaw ethnic politics -in non-state violence associated in Ijawland, which compels empirical research. In favour of this theory, I argue that the presence of natural resources in poor countries does not automatically lead to conflict as evidenced by the natural resources-endowed communities in Bostwana, Gabon, Namibia and South Africa, which, at least in the last ten years, have been relatively conflict free. Or comparatively have experienced lower tensions than in the The Niger Delta. Also some scholars argue that the presence of ethnic groups does not necessarily translate into conflict as some of the most diverse countries like Tanzania in Africa, Malaysia in Asia, Belgium, and Switzerland in Europe are stable; 16 and on the contrary, mono-ethnic or less diverse countries like Somalia either have experienced violence or remain potentially unstable.
17
In this sense, violence and ethnically divided societies in Nigeria may not be related, especially since other variables such as the features of state failure abound.
18 Thus David Leonard and Scott in their work argue against the resort to 'tribalism' often presented as the source of violent conflict in Africa. But, they also warn against dismissing the role of ethnicity since this would ignore the circumstances under which ethnic diversity becomes 'politicised' ethnic conflict.
19
Bearing in mind the limitations of a simple linear relationship between ethnicity and conflict, this paper adopts a theory of the role of ethnic politics, which interrogates the convergence of constructed Ijaw ethnic group politics and oil resource-related non-state violence in the Niger Delta. 20 In this context, the former is politically mobilised and then manipulated so that political and material grievances become ethnically defined -a justification for my paper's research into the debate on non-state violence in Ijawland. Hence, the relevance of the ethnic politics debate from knowledge of Ijaw history or rhetoric and the contemporary political economy of Nigeria -way beyond the primordialist connotation -requires further empirical study and analysis. 21 To this extent, a more nuanced understanding needs to appreciate the role of socio-political forces, like the Ijaw ethnic group, who are embedded in the conflict in the area where oil resources are found in Nigeria. Thus the role of Ijaw ethnic politics is brought to the fore, and cannot be ignored in the explanation of non-state violence in the Niger Delta since the Kaiama Declaration of 1998.
Arguably, the Kaiama Declaration was the epitome of mobilised Ijaw ethnic politics; and moved from non-violent protest, through violent protest, to warlordism and armed militia activities, and also made the Niger Delta almost ungovernable by federal authorities by the end of the 1990s. 22 The goals of the multiple Ijaw movements may have been different, and distinguished one Ijaw ethnic group from the other. Nevertheless, Ijaw associations apply violent methods to achieving their ends, or approve of the use of direct action or both; and state responses pose human rights debate, which compels research and analysis. Thus this paper mainstreams analysis of the Kaiama Declaration of 1998, the embodiment of the 'new' mode of Ijaw politics and human rights violations by all parties in the conflict.
In the context of the long history of mobilised ethnic politics in general, and Ijaw ethnic group in particular, the Kaiama Declaration was peculiar and distinct from other ethnic minority agitations in the Niger Delta region and other regions of Nigeria in terms of the scale of violence and impact on the 'jugular' of the oil-centric revenue of Nigeria. 23 Interestingly, the Kaiama Declaration and its aftermath became synonymous with violent armed insurrection, proliferation of Ijaw political movements, criminal gangs, and warlords. 24 Other characteristics include: disruption of the oil industry and the crystallisation of Ijaw rhetoric around oil resources and local oil-related environmental issues. The FEW was marked by a series of events, which began with Ijaw youths storming Government House -the seat of government -in Bayelsa in 1998 and releasing youth leaders, one of whom was T.K. Ogoriba. Consequently, Ijaw youth leaders were arrested for circulating 'seditious' documents, which presumably raised questions about human rights violations and probity of governance under military administrators. 27 The success recorded by this rare event and other antecedents culminated in a variety of outcomes in Ijaw political movements, such as confidence was inspired in more Bayelsa youths to engage in Ijaw ethnic politics (see next section); 28 akin to the Arab Spring in Middle-East and North Africa (MENA).
The Kaiama Declaration of December 11, 1998: An Arab-like awakening in Ijawland
The Declaration has been a concrete reflection of the intersection between natural resources and conflict, such as oil, on the one hand; and the role of mobilised ethnicity in conflict in Ijawland on the other. Regarding the latter, the Ijaw ethnic movements -youth groups and political elites alike -perceive themselves as enmeshed in 'slavery, impoverished, and marginalised' under the present Nigerian federal system. 29 The material and political grievances found expression in the Kaiama communiqué, which encapsulates the philosophy and strategies to bring about the fulfilment of the aspirations of Ijaw ethnic minorities. 30 Thus on December 11, 1998, youths of Ijaw ethnic minority origin under the umbrella of the Ijaw National Congress (INC), 31 numbering 'over five thousand' and drawn from 'over five hundred communities of about forty clans' gathered in Kaiama and issued the now famous Kaiama Declaration. 32 Kaiama is a town in the Kolokuma / Opokuma Local Government Area of Bayelsa State. It is the birth place of Major Jasper Adaka Boro, the legendary Ijaw revolutionary and nationalist, and was the first person in the post-colonial Niger Delta to have carried out recorded armed guerrilla insurrection against the Nigerian state and Shell/BP.
33
The 10-point demand (see: Appendix A) was signed by Felix Tuodolo, Isaac Osuoka (also known as Thomas Sakara), Kingsley Oboh, Maxwell Oko, Nelson Azibolaneri, T.K. Ogoriba, Timi Kaiser-Wilhem, and Von Dimeaari Kemedi -the organisers of the Ijaw youth conference at Kaiama Grammar School (now a camp of the National Youth Service Corp). The spokespersons also established the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the struggle of Ijaw peoples for self-determination and justice. 34 The document denounced 'social marginalisation and environmental damage by oil companies and called for the… withdrawal from Ijaw land of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian state. Oil companies employing the services of the national army were declared enemies of the Ijaw people, and given a 3-week ultimatum to stop all exploration and exploitation in the region'.
35
The demands of Ijaw youths translate to greater political recognition, self-determination, development, employment for the Ijaws in the oil industry, and environmental rehabilitation of polluted land and water. Other Ijaw demands were a direct share in the oil profits, and ownership of all oil and land resources in Ijawland. In this sense, the Declaration addressed economic, ecological, social and political problems, and hence constituted the first real threat to government control over oil resources in the Niger Delta, the mainstay of Nigeria's economy since the 1970s.
In a more analytical sense, the Kaiama resolution denounced what was described as Nigeria's 'unbalanced' federalism and threatened to disobey undemocratic decrees. In this context, Ijaw political mobilisation appears to have been shaped by a combination of factors. In response to these issues, which are material and political in nature and underlie mobilised Ijaw politics, a host of Ijaw political associations, especially some of the youth organisations engaged in militant activities since Kaiama and post-2000. 36 The youth movements, such as the Movement for the , an alliance of local gangs led by Asari Dokubo might have emerged as a result of the culture of violence that has prevailed in Niger Delta since the 1990s. In this sense, the emergence of youth groups have been linked to criminal gangs and electoral politics, and often organised around a strong youth leader, such as Asari Dokubo. Also the Ijaw youth organisations did not seem to have completely ignored their historical roots, but from empirical examination, have re-defined their essence strategically from their interpretations of the failings of the past that emphasised elite politics and party-type campaigns primarily at the national arena, at the expense of local conditions, needs, and dynamics.
38
The violent method, which has distinguished Ijaw youth organisations from earlier Ijaw political movements, such as among youth groups earned them the name militias by state officials or insurgency by others, especially their communities. 39 On the latter, for example, one interviewee called themselves: ''Mau Mau' or freedom fighters challenging mugu fall guy wack mentality of others against Ijaw people'
.40
Interestingly, this narrative of Ijaw politics and violence could not be entirely correct. Historically, Mau Mau freedom fighters are associated with Kenya's political struggle against British colonial rule. This is not akin to the Ijaw case considering that Nigeria, consisting of heterogeneous peoples became an independent country on October 1, 1960; and more importantly the Ijaw have a wholly Ijaw state governed by Ijaw indigenes.
Nonetheless, from the point of view of the minority ethnic perception, the structural outcome of Nigeria's independence dictated the link between 'power and number', which was based on the size of ethnic groups, and the attendant fear of 'economic marginalisation' and 'powerlessness' among minority ethnic groups in the three regions. 41 The other explanation is uneven rates of development among the various groups and regions, which underpinned the struggle for state power and regionalisation of politics, in particular party and electoral politics. Thus non-state violence in Ijawland culminated in the Egbesu Wars. One striking incidence of the Wars and the emergence of the Fourth Republic was the invasion of Odi in November 1999, which manifested a state and non-state violence that have become significant features of mobilised Ijaw ethnic minority politics since the Kaiama Declaration of 1998. Suffice to say, multiple Ijaw political movements that were festering beneath the surface presented themselves at Kaiama in response to the clarion call by the signatories of the Kaiama Declaration. 43 They include: the Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHR), the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), and the Movement for the Reparations to Ogbia (MORETO). Others are the Chikoko Movement, National Union of Bayelsa Students, the Nembe 1895 Movement, and the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA). Membership of the political movements was proliferated mainly by 'youth', backed by powerful and influential local ethnic warlords who became active in post-Kaiama Ijaw political activities.
Emergence and activities of

44
MOSIEND and other Ijaw youth organisations, such as IYM this study identified, is a 'metaphor' of a decentralised broad alliance of local resistance group engaged in what Clarkson, an interviewee, terms 'liberation struggles' in Ijawand.
45 The group's aims and membership overlap, such as community vigilante, armed political movements, and they are engaged in criminal activities across the Niger Delta region, where the country is most vulnerable because of its dependence on oil resources. A variety of youth groups, like MOSIEND may have been thrown up by socio-economic challenges facing Nigeria at the time. Nonetheless some of the youth group leaders also belong to cult groups existing in universities and are courted by state and national governments in the struggle for power since the introduction of the Fourth Republic in 1999.
In a more analytical sense, the Ijaw political movements developed into conventional and militant organisations. Under this broad classification of Ijaw associations, three categories can be teased out based on Ikelegbe's work, 46 namely:
• first, apex Ijaw movements that represent and speak for a variety of Ijaw communities in Bayelsa State, which are composed of political elites and elders.
• second, a plethora of youth associations, such as IYM and MOSIEND, the foot soldiers of Kaiama Declaration.
• third and lastly, specialised Ijaw associations, which mobilise Ijaw people for specific interests, such as environmental rights, and women's group interests. They also include pan-ethnic Ijaw movements in the diaspora or exile groups with extensive organisational structures that lend sophisticated support to local youth groups, and also articulate Ijaw ethnic minority politics across the states of the South-South GeoPolitical Area in the national and international arena.
The generational groups that proliferate among Ijaw ethnic movements at Kaiama, according to a study constitute the 'actual players or instrument of violence' in the confrontation with oil companies and state security forces.
47
Similarities can also be drawn from the earlier role of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa in Rivers State, another Niger Delta state east of Bayelsa State. This sister group for instance, midwived the formation of the National Youth Council for the Ogoni people (NYCOP), which redefined itself as (MOSOP), thereby leaving lessons for the Ijaw youths, such as MOSIEND, to mastermind the Kaiama Declaration. Arguably, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Rivers State, from where Bayelsa State was carved out in 1996, might have been a precedent or perhaps an inspiration. Interestingly, in the wake of Ken Saro-Wiwa's campaigns for the Ogoni and his judicial murder by the federal government, numerous ethnic-based organisations, such as MOSIEND, have sprouted to demand environmental justice from the federal government and oil companies operating in Ijawland. Though the rationale for the formation of generational groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria since the 1990s requires further interrogation, it is suffice to remark that they might have been based partly on the logic of existence, and to draw attention to their objective conditions. 
49
Thus MOSIEND organised press conferences and peaceful protests on one level, and on another, extremists among the youth group were involved in 'shutting down flow stations belonging to AGIP and Shell, and were quick to take hostages', and hence violated human rights. 50 In this context, the group was a mixture of genuine individuals involved in legitimate agitations against perceived political and material grievances and criminal gangs within their rank and file engaged in a war economy in the Niger Delta.
51 As a matter of fact, since the Fourth Republic, MOSIEND, IYM, and a number of other youth groups, some of them faceless, such as Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have been operating across the Niger Delta, based in ethnic communities from where they draw their support and loyalty.
52
An analysis of MOSIEND shows that its quasi-organisational structure has at the head the president, T.K.Ogoriba, and the secretary-general, who runs the movement's organisation on a daily basis and during crisis. Like many other Ijaw political movements, MOSIEND claimed its aim was to bring to an end perceived 'oppression and degradation of the Ijaw'.
53 It is not surprising that, its members became the 'think tank' of the Kaiama Declaration and its aftermath, and their ideas contributed to the birth of an umbrella Ijaw youth group, known as Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) with Felix Toudolo, living in the United Kingdom at the time of study as its first president.
SD (real names withheld), an Ijaw activist I interviewed, recounts a version of the origin of militancy in 'old' Rivers State, which is shared by MOSIEND members interviewed, that:
The first hostage-taking was to attract internationa attention to their grievance because of their influence on oil companies (mainly multinational) operating in Ijawland, who they find more loyal to the Federal government than the peoples and communities where they do business.
54
That said, two wrongs cannot make a right, since hostage-taking infringed upon the human rights and freedom of the victim. Nonetheless, the activism of the Ijaw youth movements, which are a reflection of the changing nature of Ijaw politics, is manifest in vigorous local debates, either in their tacit support for or the increase in the activities of militia groups within their ranks. Arguably, perceived failings of a range of government intervention strategies through regulation, enforcement, and to some extent unsustainable community-based participation have left most members of the Ijaw groups, especially the youth, at the margins of oil wealth in Nigeria. In this light, the aims, objectives, methods and processes of Ijaw ethnic politics and violence have been converted to a broad and participatory struggle in the aftermath of the Kaiama Declaration.
In the wider context, the opinions of key Ijaw participants -educated and uneducated political elites and youth leaders alike, and rank and file of Ijaw people who are not members of formal activist groups -are broadly similar and find common ground. For example, MOSIEND members as well as other Ijaw elite movements consider the Kaiama resolution as the "Ijaw Bible", and that the document contains the Egbesu spirit, the Ijaw god. 55 In the words of a key Ijaw participant and member of the Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM):
Kaiama is the compass of Ijaw struggle, a working document that gives effect to Ijaw claims yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Kaiama means everything, which includes total emancipation of the Niger Delta.
56 Yet another Kaiama participant and member of MOSIEND is of the opinion that:
Kaiama is a document of Ijaw grievances against the Federal government and oil companies. Hence, the immediate outcome of the gathering together of mobilised Ijaw ethnic groups at Kaiama was a heightening of rhetoric and tensions, which snowballed into a direct confrontation between the Federal Government of Nigeria and oil companies operating in Bayelsa State with many implications for human rights. On December 30, 1998, when the ultimatum given to the federal government and oil companies operating in Ijawland expired, the Ijaw youth organisations initiated a series of activities in stages that subsequently changed the dynamic of protest marches into violence. Through non-violent means MOSIEND and other members of the pan-Ijaw Youth Council engaged in singing and dancing of the traditional Ogele dance in Ijaw towns and villages to sensitise and mobilise Ijaw ethnic groups for the Ijaw cause.
58 These songs were sang in the streets of Yenagoa, the capital city of Bayelsa State, and conveyed messages of solidarity, justice, and invocation of the Egbesu spirit, axiomatic of a cultural resistance. According to one activist:
In the face of eminent confrontation with the Federal Government, the Ijaw people fell back to their traditional religion to protect them, and when the rituals are done and participants adhere to the rules, the Egbesu Spirit works.
59
The wave of activism was manifest in the increasing activities by Ijaw youth groups, and the trend whereby women from oil communities also participated in the Ogele dance and -by extension -the storming of oil platforms, which presents a relationship between 'civil' and 'ethnic' identity perspectives of non-state violence in Niger Delta. 60 The relatively nopeace no-war process was not destined to last for very long. Informal alliances with international environmental, civil society, and human rights groups, who are adept at using skills, media, and other avenues in spreading their message, gave Ijaw movements allies who were skilled in manipulation of the mass media;
61 similar to what is taking place in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as I write.
In the context of this paper's analysis, the youths generated increasing political pressure on the state by eventually taking justice into their own hands for a variety of reasons. First, the inability of the federal military government to react creatively to the demands by the Ijaw youth organisations; hence they felt encouraged to enforce their demands. Second, generational control of the Ijaw political movements at the time underpins the radical approach adopted in achieving their aims and objectives, which tapped into decades of Ijaw material and political grievances. 62 Thus the so call 'Ghandhi' perspective of non-violence initially conducted around environmental, economic, and social issues was replaced by more popular and local level violent anti-state and oil company agitations. 63 Third and lastly, MOSIEND, for instance, in this day and age has ready access to information dissemination and communication tools to draw widespread attention to the Niger Delta. Hence, the Ijaw youth groups drew support from members of the Niger Delta Diasporas, and effectively engaged in series of media campaigns, protest marches, and direct action taking advantage of their familiarity with the Niger Delta's geomorphology. 64 Instructively, the criminal activities of some Ijaw youth groups are condemnable according to a scholar on Ijaw politics, who asserts that: some of the youths abused the process of legitimate demands, which elevated individual and parochial interests at the expense of the collective Ijaw cause. more militant and a fighting force engaged in oil pipeline vandalism and abduction of oil company employees. 66 Since oil communities became inundated with small arms and arming militia groups, resentment among youth groups began to draw support across and beyond the communities.
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The NDPVF group has been linked to criminal elements involved in oil bunkering but the group's leadership claim they were simply taking that which belongs to the Ijaw people [the oil].
68 According to reports, highly organised conglomerates of oil bunkerers comprising of expatriate and local businessmen, high-level politicians and military personnel, and even employees of the oil companies have also recruited youth leaders and their organisations for ends that were no less criminal. 69 An interviewee also contributed to the prevalence of human rights violations and criminal activities linked to youth groups in Ijawland:
Criminal gangs are supported in their communities because they channel their 'loot' into filling the social gaps abandoned by various governments' responsibility to its citizens. For example, the militants support community healthcare centres with financial resources, they fund students to sit for university entry examinations, and award scholarships to individuals to study for university degrees in Ghana and Western universities.
70
A study elsewhere argues that where armed groups dominate, youth become not only important instruments in the use of force but leaders as well.
71 These activities of social or conflict actors in Ijawland might have been complementary to the country's democratisation process that began in the 1990s and is evident in adopted strategies of non-state violence in Ijawland.
72 In this context, grassroot discontent in Niger Delta was converted to a comprehensive struggle expressed in oil pipeline vandalism, abduction of oil company employees, reprisals against groups considered allies of the state and oil companies, and hence a lack of respect for human rights.
In a more analytical sense, Ijaw youth organisations were driven by the principles espoused in the Kaiama Declaration of 1998, which articulated the all-embracing issues of Ijaw minority marginalisation. However, their composition, conduct, and pronouncements on Ijaw rights and oil-led environmental damage also raised other issues, which arguably flagged the question of whether the Ijaw youth groups introduced and politicised environmental degradation issues with which the oil communities had co-existed for decades? Or was the changing dynamic of politicised Ijaw ethnic politics since the 1990s constructed into a struggle for environmental rights and oil resource control as a convenient platform for a 'new' politically motivated violence in Ijawland? The Kaiama document signposted the convergence of oil and environment as significant popular issues, which require further analysis (see next paragraph) since oil-led environmental debate interfaced with broader Ijaw ethnic politics.
Arguably, Ijaw youth organisations became more environmentally and socially conscious of their world in the 1990s, and the environment-related subject and its connection with oil operations in Niger Delta was made a prominent issue in the Kaiama resolution of 1998. 73 This subject easily mobilised Ijaw ethnic politics -ordinary Ijaw folks and activist groups alike -by attributing oil-led environmental degradation to neglect by the Nigerian federal system. Table 1.1.3A shows some activity and impact of oil operations in Bayelsa State. The Kaiama participants formulated ideas around the fusion of oil resources and environment to mobilise Ijaw sentiments, which transformed the oil-related environmental subject to a conflict issue in and of itself. Though environmental damage from non-oil causes abounds in the Niger Delta, environmental-related resentment only seems to have become a subject of strong concern in Ijaw political rhetoric since the Kaiama Declaration.
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Nigeria's national revenue since the 1970s has come mainly from oil resources, obtained with damage to the environment. In respect of the environmental debate, it was the activities of neighbouring Rivers State elites that began to articulate the issue and connection between oil-led environmental damage and human rights in the Niger Delta region well before the creation of the Ijaw state in 1996.
75 In this context, substantial work on oil and the Niger Delta argues that oil communities in the region are victims of public choices from laisse-faire policies and official actions by the government, which have contributed to the damage and neglect of the environment.
76 Arguably, Ijaw political movements might have focussed attention on the new global environmental management, which elevated the sustainable development debate, and coalesced with identity politics in the context of the Niger Delta region.
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The shifting ground and emphasis of identity politics was now moving away from the visible planks of minority agitations associated with Ijaw ethnic politics in the past, and crystallised with the inner-logic of the Kaiama resolution of 1998. Though Bayelsa State suffers from erosion, flooding, and rising sea levels resulting from direct and indirect causes, the link between oil and environmental damage was taken up by Ijaw political elites and youth groups at the end of the 1990s, which interfaced with wider Ijaw ethnic politics articulated by Ijaw youth groups.
78 Local and national oil-related environment issues resonated with Ijaw youth groups at Kaiama, as captured in a study on land use and land cover changes in the Niger Delta region.
79 Hence, claims of oil communities that the oil business polluted their air and water, and disrupted their sense of community, were made in the context of the trajectories of Ijaw politics and perceived human rights abuses.
Another interesting angle in this analysis is that the ground for environment and politics-related agitation had become favourable in the face of countrywide demands for democracy, and the insistence on good governance in Nigeria during the 1990s.
80 Ikelegbe contributed to this brand of debate at the time by his assertion that the era coincided with the flowering of civil societies in the global arena in the popular struggles for democratisation and respect for human rights that converged with the annulment of the presidential elections in Nigeria in 1993.
81 This era thus coincided with the transition from military rule to civil rule in Nigeria, which culminated in the Fourth Republic of 1999. Given this and other developments illuminated in the previous paragraph, the Ijaw ethnic movements were enkindled to 'talk' the complex but now fashionable language of democracy and human rights and to link them to their environmental situation. citizens relating to human rights violations, an important focus of this paper's analysis on state responses. Nonetheless, the adoption of the Kaiama Declaration by Ijaw movements cascaded the entry of Ijaw youths into the political domain, and provided a platform for them to arguably consider their political rights within the Nigerian federal system.
84 For example, Ijaw youth movements repudiated the conventional 'more state creation' approach, which has been associated with Ijaw politics since the 1950s as conciliatory. 85 To this extent, the Ijaw ethnic minorities were mobilised politically to challenge government and oil companies for perceived neglect and lack of development in their communities. In this context, the potential for non-state violence festered side by side with a variety of claims by Ijaw political associations that honed politicised minority-related notions of disadvantage, self-determination and equity, and a growing preparedness to respond to the militarism of central government and the complicity of oil companies.
86
Evidence from fieldwork research in the Niger Delta suggest that items in the Kaiama Declaration of 1998 have not been addressed in any significant sense since the emergence of Fourth Republic -considering that development issues in Ijawland remain of great concern, and many of the issues, such as oil-led environmental damage, resource control, poverty, and corruption are still prominent. As regards the latter, for example, one interviewee told me that, if Alamieyeseigha (one of their own) could 'steal from us and from posterity, and mismanage our resources, we excuse others for thievery in the Ijawland'. 
Post-Kaiama Declaration: State and Oil Company responses to non-state violence in the Niger Delta
The attempt to engage in cultural resistance as seen in Ijaw youth protest marches, and mass action against oil companies as they elevated security around their operations, resulted in the federal government increasing deployment of the military in oil communities -with all the implications for human rights violations to date. According to Frynas' work, state and oil company approaches to non-state violence in Ijawland were conventional and geared towards managing conflict, and three generic strategies were discernible.
89
They included: 'new' development intervention regimes by the state (see another paper by this author for a more detailed analysis); 90 the use of public relations especially by oil companies operating in Niger Delta; 91 and the 'militarisation' of Ijawland by the central government. 92 Concerning the latter, and since this was under military dispensation, the government's policy response to youth mobilisation after the Kaiama Declaration was predictable. Based on this, the Bayelsa State military administrator at the time, Lt Col. Edor Obi (1998-1999) declared a state of emergency and arrested the signatories of the Kaiama document. 94 Thus the proliferation of special military task forces, a mechanism aimed at achieving a military solution has been one of government's response to Ijaw politics and violence in Bayelsa State, as well as designed to keep and/or enforce peacebuilding in the state.
The increased deployment of the military in oil communities has led to negative implications and outcomes, such as human rights violations for the communities' most vulnerable people. 95 Inevitably, this outcome is exacerbated when oil communities become support bases for armed militia groups engaged in bunkering and other violent activities. 96 However, the military interventions by the state attest to the government's dilemma in the face of new developments by which militia groups could meet government forces in kind ('fire for fire'), and in some cases government forces in the Niger Delta region colluded with militants.
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According to one interviewee, the relationship between military personnel and armed groups also reinforces criminality in Ijawland:
The potential wealth generated in Bayelsa State sustains the temptation for officers and men deployed to the Ijaw state to be part of the criminal gangs rather than to stop them. For example, a soldier who is on a poor salary of about 7,000 Naira a month can be offered one-tenth of the price of illegal crude ($60) from criminals and he is greatly better off than if he withdrew support for armed groups operating in the creeks.
98
To lend credence to this interviewee's view point, the Nigerian military authority recently, through a general courtmartial in Kaduna, sentenced an Army Officer and five soldiers to life imprisonment for illegal arms supply to militant groups involved in criminal activities in the Niger Delta region. 99 Arguably, cases like this are few and far between; more isolated than systemic.
Remarkably, the Federal government's military approach to Ijaw politics was complemented with the creation of the Institute for Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution in the Presidency in Abuja in 1999, perhaps due to the recognition of the limitations of a military solution. This idea was therefore part of the institutionalisation of conflictresolution mechanisms of the Federal Government of Nigeria to address protracted social conflict in the country in general and Ijaw politics and non-state violence in the Niger Delta region in particular. Among its many roles, this body, in conjunction with multilateral and bilateral organisations undertook a conflict assessment of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria in 2002. 100 The organisations were DFID, the EU, UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank. Arguably, ample empirical evidence suggests that protracted social conflict tends to be associated with uneven patterns of development. 101 Similarly, Tom Woodhouse et al argue that grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively and cultivate a niche for a protracted social conflict; 102 and Paul Gready argues that denial of human rights is a structural cause of conflict because basic human needs are not met, signposting non-state violence in Ijawland. 103 In sum, the Kaiama Declaration of 1998 -termed the Ijaw 'Bible' -produced the watershed and 'them' mentality in ethnic terms by some, such as one interviewee's claims regarding 'discrimination' against Ijaw ethnic minority. 111 However, another interviewee's position and other key Ijaw participants interviewed echoed that:
The Ijaw are not engaged in an ethnic struggle against ethnic majorities. The government and oil companies owe my community development, and not treat us as 'lepers' in our own land. Suffice to state that despite these developments, Kaiama and its aftermath are yet to go away, and possibly the parochial objective of self-serving electoral politics in Nigeria at all levels inflame the goals of the wider mobilised Ijaw ethnic minority politics.
114 From the standpoint of some Ijaw political elites, their Kaiama strategy is more a means to stir other groups for national development, rather than the prevailing and dangerous habit of all ethnic groups in Nigeria perpetually waiting for federal allocation, which is largely from oil revenue. Though more research is necessary to authenticate the accuracy of this position, my paper suggests that the 'frontline' actors of Ijaw politics mobilise Ijaw ethnic populations by pushing the 'ethnic' button, and fighting in the name of a community is one way to situate Ijaw cause in a nobler framework.
Arguably, uneven rates of development among the various groups and peoples in the country underpins the struggle for state power and regionalisation of politics in Nigeria. Thus peace building and protecting human rights in the Niger Delta can be enhanced by a better understanding of Ijaw ethnic minority politics, and crafting human and infrastructure development in Ijawland. In the context of this paper's analysis, human rights-centred development perspective is a sine qua non; that translates into widespread opportunities and address neglect, and hence a key remedy to oil resource-related conflict in Nigeria.
115 In this sense, Sen's work illuminates the correlation between development and freedom; 116 and the former arguably underpins state and non-state violence and Ijaw politics associated with it in Nigeria.
That the division of the Southern Protectorate into East and West in 1939 by the British marked the beginning of the balkanisation of a hitherto territorially contiguous and culturally homogenous Ijaw people into political and administrative units, much to our disadvantage. This trend is continuing in the balkanisation of the Ijaw into six states -Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Ondo, and Rivers -mostly as minorities who suffer socio-political, economic, cultural, and psychological deprivations.
That the quality of life Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, suppression, and marginalization visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the Nigerian state and transnational oil companies.
That the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil mineral resources, which account for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national budget and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. From which 65%, 75%, and 70% respectively are derived from within the Ijaw nation. Despite these huge contributions, our reward from the Nigerian state remains avoidable deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military repression.
That the unabating damage done to our fragile natural environment and the health of our people is due in main to uncontrolled exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, which has led to numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening up of our forests to loggers, indiscriminate canalization, flooding, land subsidence, coastal erosion, earth tremors etc. Oil and gas are exhaustible resources and the complete lack of concern for ecological rehabilitation, in the light of the Oloibiri experience, is a signal of impending doom for the peoples of Ijawland. That the violence in Ijawland and other parts of the Niger Delta area, sometimes manifesting in intra-an inter-ethnic conflicts are sponsored by the State and transnational oil companies to keep the communities of the Niger Delta area divided, weak and distracted from the causes of their problems.
That the recent revelations of the looting of national treasury by the Abacha junta is only a reflection of an existing and continuing trend of stealing by public office holders in the Nigerian state. We remember the over 12 billion dollars Gulf War windfall, which was looted by Babangida and his cohorts. We note that over 70% of the billions of dollars being looted by the military rulers and their civilian collaborators is derived from our ecologically devastated Ijawland.
Based on the foregoing, we, the youths of Ijawland hereby make the following resolutions to be known as the Kaiama Declaration:
8. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.
9. We cease to recognize all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples / communities of the right to ownership and control our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and the Petroleum Decree, etc.
10. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian state. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian state to "protect" its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone.
